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Summary  findings
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distortionary taxes in the labor market.  labor supply.
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Abstract
This paper explores the  interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion  and pre-
existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. A congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to
work and discourages labor force participation at the margin, when revenues are returned  in lump-sum
transfers. We find that the resulting efficiency loss in the labor market can be larger than the Pigouvian
efficiency gains from internalizing the congestion externality. In contrast, if congestion tax revenues are
used to reduce labor taxes the net impact on labor supply is positive, and the efficiency gain in the labor
market can raise the overall welfare gains of the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent. Recycling
congestion  tax revenues in  public transit  subsidies produces a  positive,  but smaller,  impact  on  labor
supply.
In short  our results  indicate that the presence  of pre-existing tax  distortions, and  the form of
revenue recycling, can crucially affect the magnitude, and possibly even the sign, of the welfare effect of
road-pricing schemes. The efficiency gains from recycling congestion tax revenues in other tax reductions
can amount to several times the Pigouvian welfare gains from congestion reduction.
1. Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the volume of road traffic and associated
delays due to congestion throughout the world. In the United States total vehicle miles traveled increased
by 82 percent between 1969 and 1990.1  Traffic congestion imposes substantial costs on society. Schrank
and  Lomnax  (1996)  estimated that  the  costs  of travel  delays  and  additional  fuel  consumption  due  to
congestioni  amounted to $51 billion for the United States in 1993. The problems of traffic congestion are
likely to worsen in the future with growing populations, real income, and labor force participation rates.
Thus, there is mounting pressure for policies to reduce, or at least curb the growth of, traffic congestion'
Clearly, it is important to understand the economic impacts of proposed measures, and optimal amount of
traffic restraint.
One approach to traffic restraint, often advocated by economists, is to require drivers to pay more
for road use during peak periods. This policy represents a more direct, and hence more efficient, way to
' From  Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States 1997,  table 1015.
2 See e.g. The  conomist, Dec 6th, 1997 pp. 15-16. The traditional response to roadway congestion has been to build
more roads, but despite considerable  investment-expenditure  on highway  construction  and maintenance  was $67
billion in ] 994-this  policy has failed to prevent  major  roads becoming  more and more crowded.  Additional  road
capacity  does not penalize  drivers  for adding  to congestion  and creates  more demand  for road use in the long run
(see Downs  (1992)  for a lucid  discussion).
lreduce congestion externalities than  other measures, such as parking fees, gasoline taxes, subsidies for
public transport, and high occupancy vehicle lanes.  Moreover, the development of electronic collection
devices  has  mnade  road  charges  that vary  with  traffic  volumes  over the  course  of the  day  easier  to
implement,  and  has  reduced  fears  about  the  government  collecting  information  on  peoples'  driving
habits.4
The theory of optimal congestion taxes, and how much to invest in additional road capacity, was
developed by Walters (1961), Vickrey (1963, 1968), Mohring (1965, 1970), Strotz (1965), Kraus et al.
(1976),  and  others.  The  basic  framework  has  been  extended  to  capture  a  variety  of  second-best
considerations that arise from other externalities and pre-existing policies within the transport system. For
example, Newbery (1988a, 1988b) discusses accident and road damage externalities; Liu and McDonald
(1998), Braid (1996), and Verhoef et al. (1996) examine congestion taxes when congestion on competing
rotutes  goes unpriced; Glaister and Lewis (1978) examine the interaction between public transit subsidies
and traffic congestion; and Small and Kazimi (1995) study the pollution costs of vehicle travel!
This paper contributes to the literature on second-best congestion taxes by exploring interactions
with pre-existing distortions outside the transportation sector, that are caused by the tax system. It builds
on  a  growing body  of analysis, mainly  in environmental  economics, that  has  shown that  the welfare
effects  of new  regulations  can critically  depend on  how  these policies  interact  with  pre-existing  tax
distortions  in the labor market. When new regulations drive up firm production costs and product prices
they reduce the real household wage. This (slightly) reduces the overall quantity of labor supply. Given
the large wedge between gross and net-of-tax wages, this reduction in labor supply can lead to efficiency
losses that can be sizeable relative to the partial equilibrium costs  of the regulation. On the other hand,
These other  policies  do not optimally  raise  the cost of using congested  roads relative  to alternative  non-congested
roads,  or using  the road during  off-peak  periods.  Hence  they do not induce  the most efficient  substitution  away from
the congested  road  onto  alternative  transport  options.
4At  various points  within a road system  deductions  can be made  electronically  from a pre-paid  credit card installed
in vehicles.  The tag plate of the car is recorded  only  if there is insufficient  credit on the card.  Previously,  electronic
schemes  effectively  followed  each  car through  the road system  and sent monthly  bills  to car owners.  Electronic  time
of day pricing  schemes  have been implemented  in Singapore,  Norway's cities of Oslo,  Trondheim,  and Bergen,  and
will come into effect in Amsterdam,  Rotterdam,  Utrecht,  and The Hague  in Holland in 2001.  Electronic  pricing has
been slower to catch on in the United States,  but a notable example  is Route 911inking  Riverside  to Orange County
in Southern  California.  For more information  about current and planned  road pricing schemes  see the Toll Roads
Newsletter.
5 For surveys  of the literature  on road pricing  see for example Morrison  (1986), Hau (1992), and Winston  (1985).
Newbery  (1990)  provides  an overview  of the relative  importance  of these  second-best  factors  in determining  optimal
road charges. Some  recent  empirical  studies  of the welfare  gains from congestion  pricing include include  Cameron
(1994),  Mohring  and Anderson  (1994)  and Calthrop  and  Proost (1998).
2there  is an offsetting effect if regulations raise government revenues (as  pollution taxes and auctioned
pollution permits do) and this revenue is used to reduce distortionary taxes 
In this paper we embed a simple "textbook" model of traffic congestion into a series of general
equilibrium models to illustrate how the existence of tax distortions in the labor market crucially affects
the overall welfare impacts of congestion taxes. A key issue that obviously crops up with congestion fees
is  what  to  do  with  the  revenues  that  are  raised.  Often  these  revenues  are  earmarked  for  public
transportation projects  (this  has been the practice  in Norway).  Alternatively, revenues can be used to
improve ecoinomic efficiency by reducing the rates of other distortionary taxes in the economy. Indeed,
Harrington et  al.  (1998) find  a discernable reduction  in public opposition to congestion fees  if people
expect to get back some of the revenues in the form of other tax reductions. We examine cases where
congestion tax revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes and to provide subsidies for public transit
fares. We also examine the standard textbook assumption that revenues are returned to households in
lump-sum transfers and hence do not directly affect economic efficiency. To our knowledge, ours is the
first extensive comparison of these congestion policies in a second-best setting with distortionary taxes.
We find that,  if the revenues from a tax on work-related traffic congestion  are used to reduce
distortionary  labor taxes,  this  tax  shift  typically  reduces  the  deadweight  costs  of  the tax  system  by
encouraging  labor force participation  at the margin,  in addition to  offsetting the externality  distortion
from congestion. The increase in labor supply arises because the combination of reduced congestion and
reduced labor taxes more than compensates commuters (as a group) for the congestion fee, implying that
the  returns to  work-net  of taxes and commuting  costs-increase. 8 The efficiency  gains  in the  labor
6  For more discussion  see e.g. Goulder  et at. (1997) and Parry  et al. (1999).  In a different  context,  Browning  (1997)
estimated  that the welfare costs of monopoly  pricing in the United States are around ten times larger when the
impact of reduced  production  on exacerbating  tax distortions  in the labor  market is taken into account. It has long
been recognized  in the public finance  literature  that regulatory  policies  interact  with the tax system  and this causes
the general equilibrium  welfare impact  of these policies  to differ from the partial equilibrium  effect (e.g. Harberger
(1974)). The contribution  of the more recent literature is to demonstrate  the potentially substantial empirical
magnitude  of this welfare difference.  For a review of the literature,  and its policy implications,  see for example
Parry and Oates (1998).
7In  an earlier study Repetto  et al. (1992) estimate  that the welfare  gains from recycling  revenues  in other tax cuts
can be substantial  relative to the partial equilibrium  welfare gain from imposing a  set of Pigouvian taxes on
congested  roads in the United States.  This study makes a valid point about the importance  of revenue  recycling.
However,  since the study does not utilize  a general equilibrium  model it does not capture important  interactions
between  congestion  taxes and pre-existing  taxes in the labor  market.  Mayeres  and Proost  (1997) analyze  congestion
taxes as part of an optimal  tax system,  and Mayeres  (1998)  reports  some simulation  results  on congestion  taxes  from
a computable  general equilibrium  model of the Belgian economy.  Our paper builds on these earlier studies by
considering  more alternatives  for revenue recycling  and illustrating  the welfare impacts  of policies across a wide
range of values  for key parameter  values.
8 As discussed  below,  this result differs  from that in a number  of other  recent studies  of environmental  taxes. These
studies  find that the introduction  of a pollution  tax typically  reduces  labor  supply,  even when  the revenues  are used
to cut distortionary  labor  taxes. In the present  paper reducing  the externality-congestion costs-induces a feedback
3market can raise the overall efficiency gains from the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent under a
wide range of assumptions about parameter values.
In sharp contrast,  if congestion tax revenues are used to finance government transfer payments
instead of cutting  labor taxes, the net impact of the congestion tax is to reduce household wages net of
taxes  and  commuting  costs  and  discourage  labor  supply.  In  most  of  our  simulations  the  resulting
efficiency  cost  in the  labor  market more than  offsets the entire  welfare  gains from  internalizing  the
congestion externality! When congestion tax revenues are used to finance public transit subsidies rather
than labor tax cuts, the net impact on labor supply can be positive, but is smaller. In addition, this policy
fails to optimally allocate commuters among alternative transport modes. We find that these sources of
inefficiency can become relatively "large" at more substantial amounts of traffic reduction.
To sum up, the presence of pre-existing tax distortions, and the form of revenue recycling, can
crucially  affect  the  magnitude of the  welfare  effect  of road-pricing schemes.  In fact  in many  of our
scenarios the form of revenue recycling determines whether the policy produces a very substantial welfare
gain,  or  whether  the  net  impact  is actually  to reduce social  welfare.  In  this  connection,  regulations  that
restrict  hIow local  governments  could  use  revenues  from  congestion  taxes-such  as  those  in  Britain
stipulating  that  such  revenue  sources  must  be  used  for  public  transport-rnay  significantly  limit  the
potential  efficiency  gains  from  this  policy.
Some  important  caveats  are  in  order.  First,  our  objective  is  to  illustrate  the  magnitude  of  the
spillover  effect  from  congestion  taxes  in  the  labor  market,  relative  to  the  efficiency  gain  from
internializing  the  congestion  externality.  For  this  purpose  we  abstract  from  a  number  of  practical
complications  that  affect  transportation  systems.  For  example,  we  use  a  static  analysis  in  which  road
capacity  and  the  geographical  location  of  firms  and  households  are  fixed.  We  ignore  the  complications
posed  by multiple  congestion  externalities,  pollution  and  accident  externalities,  and  pre-existing  transport
policies  such  as  gasoline  taxes,  vehicle  fees,  and  inefficient  pricing  of  public  transportation.  We  also
abstract  from  distributional  considerations,  and  sidestep  the  important  public  choice  issue  of  how  new
revenue  sources  might  actually  be  used  in practice,  given  the  pressures  for  additional  spending  and  tax
relief  from  competing  interest  groups.  Nonetheless,  we  believe  that  the  key  mechanisms  highlighted  in
our  analysis  would  be at work  in more  general  models.  Our  analysis  should  be  viewed  as  component  that
mighlt be usefully  inserted  into more  comprehensive  models  of congestion  taxes9
effect that partially mitigates the adverse impact of the congestion tax on labor supply, prior to revenue recycling.
As a result of this feedback effect, the overall impact on labor supply can be positive when revenues finance cuts in
labor taxes.
Put another way, the general equilibrium welfare effects of congestion taxes can be decomposed into the welfare
gain from reducing the congestion extemality, the welfare effect in the labor market, and additional welfare effects
due to interactions with pre-existing policies and other externalities within the transport system. Our focus is purely
4Second, our analysis focuses only on weekday rush hour traffic congestion. As we discuss, there
are notable examples of congestion caused by leisure activities (e.g. people going to the beach). In these
cases congestion taxes would not reduce labor supply prior to revenue recycling, though the (absolute)
welfare  gain from using the revenues to cut distortionary taxes rather thani finance lump-sum transfers
would be the same as in our analysis. Third, in practice congestion tax revenues may be used for a variety
of purposes other than assumed in our analysis, such as providing more public goods or reducing local
sales  or  property  taxes.  Below  we  comment  on  how  our  results  might  be  affected  by  alternative
assumptions about revenue recycling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in section 2 with an analytical model that
decomposes  the  general  equilibrium  welfare  effects  of  altemative  taxes  on  work-related  traffic
congestioni, in the presence of distortionary labor taxes. Sections 3 and 4 describe and present simulation
results on1  the welfare impacts of congestion taxes, using a more detailed version of the analytical model
that is solved numerically. Section 5 concludes and discusses limitations to the analysis.
2. Analytical  Model
A. Model Assumptions
We  model  a  static  economy  where  households  make  both  a  labor/leisure  decision  and  a
tranisportation mode decision for rush-hour travel. The utility of the representative household is given by:
(2.1)  U = u(C, N)  + T(R, P)
where u(.) and T(.) are quasi-concave and continuous. C denotes aggregate consumption of market goods
and N is leisure, or time spent at home in non-market activities. R and P denote the number of days in a
period that the household commutes to work using a congested road (such as an urban expressway) and
using non-congested rail transit, or metro.  Although the purpose of transport activity in this model is for
people to get to  work, we  allow for  some utility T(.) from travelling.  This enables  us  to incorporate
imperfect substitutability between transportation modes.0
The household time endowment is denoted L,  which we interpret as the product of the number
of hours per day and the number of days in a given period. Households choose how many days to work
on the labor  market  effects,  and we believe  that the size of these  effects  would  not be greatly  affected  by introducing
pre-existing  transit  subsidies,  gasoline  taxes,  pollution  externalities,  etc.  into the analysis.
I"T  may represent  the utility from listening  to the radio in the car and from reading a book on the train. Or more
generally  T may be negative  if commuting  causes  a lot of stress and boredom.  The separability  in (2.1) implies  that
the transportation  mode decision does not affect the amount of work effort. We regard this as a  reasonable
simplification.
5(L), but they are not free to choose the hours of work per day. We normalize units such that a day at work
involves one unit of time. Labor supply (or total days worked) is therefore:
(2.2)  L=R+P
Each time  the  household  commutes by  road  it  loses  Tr  units  of time,  and  each time  the  household
commutes by metro it loses 0 units of time. The household time constraint is:
(2.3)  L=N+L+7rR±+P
that is, the time endowment equals the sum of leisure, labor supply, and travel time."
We assume the following relationship:
(2.4)  ,r='r(R)
where d>O. The average number of households using the road per day depends on the number of trips of
the representative household over the period. As road use increases, the amount of congestion increases,
and this reduces average speeds hence raising commute time, ;r. The number of people using the road is
large,  therefore  Xr is effectively  exogenous  to  an  individual  household.  This  introduces  the  familiar
externality  problem:  when deciding  whether to  use the road households  do not take  account of their
impact on raising the commuting costs of all other road users.
In contrast, we assume that the time  involved in commuting by public transit is not affected by
the total number of commuters, that is, 0 is a constant. For now we keep things simple by assuming that
transportation only requires household time  and not real resource inputs such as gasoline, maintaining
roads, trains, and so on. Obviously this is unrealistic, but it turns out not to affect the key results in our
numerical analysis.
To keep our analysis focussed on labor market effects we abstract from a host of other factors that
can complicate the welfare effects of congestion taxes. These include possible congestion on the metro,
gasoline taxes, parking subsidies, vehicle registration fees, and other externalities from driving  such as
pollution, wear and tear on roads, and car accidents. Moreover, public transport subsidies are pervasive in
practice  as  a  second-best  response  to  driving  externalities,  perhaps  when  road  pricing  is politically
difficult. In principle our analysis could be extended to allow for these factors, and hence provide a more
comprehensive analysis  of congestion-reducing  policies (we briefly return to  the issue  of pre-existing
transit subsidies in Section 4B).
Firms  are  competitive  and  employ  labor to produce the  consumption  good.  We  assume  the
marginal product of labor is constant, hence firm profits are zero. Labor productivity is not affected by the
We are assuming  that leisure on work and non-work days are perfect substitutes. This is not an important
restriction  for our  purposes.
6mode of transport that is used to get to work. The marginal product of labor is normalized to imply a price
of unity for the consumption good, and we normalize the gross wage to unity.
The government levies a proportional tax of t on labor earnings and provides a lump-sum transfer
of G to houselholds.' 2 It also levies a congestion (or road) tax of r which is paid each time a household
uses the road. For the moment, we assume that congestion tax revenues are used either to reduce the labor
tax or to increase the transfer payment. In these cases the government budget constraint is:
(2.5)  tL±+R=G
That is, revenues from the labor and congestion taxes equals government spending.
The household budget constraint is:
(2.6)  C±+R=(I-t)L+G
The left-hand side of this equation is spending per period on the consumption good and the congestion
tax. The right-hand  side  is net-of-tax labor  income plus the  government transfer.  Households  choose
leisure (N), consumption (C), labor supply (L), and the number of days travelling to work by road (R) and
metro  (P), to  maximize  utility (2.1)  subject to  the  budget  constraint (2.6),  the  time  constraint  (2.3),
equation (2.2), and taking gras exogenous. From the household's first order conditions we can obtain:
(2.7a)  I1-t = (I + )T) UN  _  TR + 
U(.  U(
(2.7b)  1-  t=  (1+ 0)  N  _  _
UC(  UC.
These equations equate the  private benefit from an extra day's  work-the  net wage-with  the  private
cost. The cost is the value of leisure time forgone by working and commuting an extra day by either mode
of transport, minus the marginal utility from commuting (both these terms are expressed in consumption
units), plus the congestion tax in the case of the road. From these equations we obtain:
(2.8)  UN  _T  + ,;  =  UN  _Tr
UC.  UC  U(  U(.
That is, in equilibrium the cost of commuting an additional day by road equals the cost of commuting an
additional day by public transit.
From the household's  first order conditions and constraints we can also obtain the demand for
road-use  and  public  transit,  and  labor  supply,  as  functions  of  parameters  that  are  exogenous  to
households:
12 Roughly  speaking,  G may represent transfer  payments (such as pensions),  or public spending that is a close
substitute  for private  spending  (possible  examples  include  health  care, education,  food  stamps).
7(2.9)  R = R(r,t,G,)  P = P(r,t,G,)  L = L(r,t,G,)
B. The Welfare Effects of Road Taxes
We llow  analyze the welfare impacts of (marginally) increasing the congestion tax under different
scenarios about how the revenues are recycled.
(i) Revenue-Neutral Congestion Tax
Suppose there  is an  incremental increase  in the  congestion tax r and the  government  budget
constraint is maintainied by adjusting the rate of labor tax. The welfare effect of this policy change can be
expressed (see the Appendix):
(2.10)  R UN_r  }{  - +R  t dL
UC  ~  di-  di-
r'RuA/u(  is the marginal external cost of road use. It equals the utility loss (in consumption units) per road
user due to the increase in commuting time from an additional driver, multiplied by the number of road
users. Households do not take this term in to account when deciding whether to go to work by road. An
incremenital increase in the congestion tax produces a welfare gain equal to the difference between the
marginal external  cost  and the  congestion tax, multiplied  by  the  induced reduction  in  road  use. The
second term in (2.10) is the change in labor supply multiplied by the labor tax, or the wedge between the
gross and net-of-tax household wage. The gross wage reflects the value marginal product of labor and the
net wage equals the opportunity cost to households of an extra day's work, that is, the opportunity cost of
the time spent at work plus the costs of commuting. Whether there is a welfare gain or loss in the labor
market depends on whether the general equilibrium impact of the policy change is to increase or decrease
labor  supply.'3
From differentiating (2.9) when G is constant, the change in labor supply can be separated into
tlhree  effects:
±  +
dL  aL  {  aLdt  Ja  ,dRd
(2.1 1)  - =  -+  -- v  -z  cidR
dr  aT  -c  t  dzJ  aT0  drJ
wlhere  (from differentiating (2.5) and using (2.9)):
dR  dL
(2.12)  dt  dr-  di- <0
dz-  ~  L
Note that changes  in the demand  for the metro do not (directly)  produce welfare  effects.  This is because  there is
no wedge  between  marginal  social  benefit  and  marginal  social  cost in the metro  market.
8The first  effect  in (2.11)  is the  negative impact on  labor supply from an  incremental  increase  in the
congestion tax. The congestion tax increases the cost of commuting to work by road and therefore reduces
the overall  return to  work effort relative to  leisure. The second effect  is the positive  impact  on labor
supply that  results from the reduction in labor tax enabled by the additional  congestion tax  revenues,
assuming ol/&  and dt/d-r  are negative." 4 The third effect is another positive impact on labor supply. This
arises  from  the  impact  of the  policy  change  on  reducing  congestion,  and  hence  the  time  costs  of
commuting to work by road.
Substituting  (2.12)  in  (2.11),  and  noting  that  aLla-=(cUlat)RIL,  gives,  after  some
manipulation:
+  +
JL  dRJa,fL  dR
(2.13)  dL  ttdL  z  dr)
dz-  1+-ta
L Et
The  denominator  in  this  expression  is positive  so  long  as  an  incremental  increase  in the  labor  tax
increases rather than decreases labor tax revenues (this condition is satisfied for the parameter values we
use below). The first term in the numerator reflects the net impact of first two effects in equation (2.11)
and it reduces labor supply, except when  r=0. Following an incremental increase in r  household surplus
in the road-use  market falls by R. However, the  government only obtains R+vdR/dv  < R in additional
revenue. Recycling the revenues back to households (by reducing the labor tax) does not fully compensate
them  for  the  increase in congestion tax hence the  net impact is to reduce  labor supply. However the
second term  in the numerator-which  reflects the  effect  of reduced  time  costs  on  encouraging  labor
supply-is  positive  even when  v=O.  Thus the overall impact  of a revenue-neutral  congestion  tax is to
increase labor supply, at least for modest levels of taxation. As a result the policy can produce a welfare
gain  in the  labor market  in addition to a  welfare  gain  from reducing the  congestion externality.  Our
numerical simulations demonstrate the crucial empirical importance of the labor market gain.
These qualitative results are different from, but still consistent with, a number of recent studies of
pollution taxes. These studies show that (under certain simplifying assumptions) a revenue-neutral tax on
14 In theory EL/at could be positive  if the income  effect (which  increases  labor supply because  leisure is a normal
good) outweighs  the substitution  effect (which  reduces  labor  supply).  We ignore  this possibility  because empirical
evidence  suggests  the uncompensated  labor  supply curve for the whole  economy  is upward  sloping (see below). In
addition  we ignore  the possibility  that at/ar is positive,  which  occurs  beyond the peak of the congestion  tax Laffer
curve. This is reasonable  because  optimal  congestion  taxes do not lead to really drastic reductions  in the number  of
road  users.
9pollution reduces labor supply and hence increases the costs of the tax system." 5 Two effects underlie this
result. First the "tax-interaction effect" is the negative impact on labor supply brought about by the effect
of  pollution taxes  on  driving  up product prices and  hience reducing the  real household wage.  This  is
analogous  to aLl/r  in (2.11). Second, the "revenue-recycling effect"  is the gain from using  additional
pollution tax reveneus to reduce the labor tax. This is analogous to (aL/Ot)(dt/dr) in (2.11).  However,
since these studies typically  assume utility  is separable in environmental  quality there  is no  feedback
effect on  labor supply from reducing pollution externalities that is analogous to the third term in (2.11),
and thie  net impact of the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects is (usually) to reduce labor supply.
Thus, the feedback term in (2.11) is crucial in explaining why the welfare effect  in the labor market  is
positive in our analysis and negative in studies of pollution taxes. Indeed if the road was not congested so
that i=0  in equation (2.13), a revenue-neutral road tax would reduce labor supply in our analysis.
Our results  are also  related to  those  from the  optimal tax  literature.  When  labor is  the only
primary input in an economy a labor tax (or equivalently a uniform consumption tax) is typically more
efficient at raising government revenues than narrow-based taxes on individual consumption goods. This
is because there are greater substitution possibilities for avoiding th-e  narrow-based tax. The key exception
to this, however, is goods that are relatively complementary with leisure. Similarly, it is easier for workers
in our model to avoid a road tax than  a labor tax, since they can change transport mode in addition to
ireducing labor  supply.  However  since  there  is  complementarity  between  the  taxed  "commodity"
(congestion) and leisure (i.e. complementarity between reducing congestion and increasing labor supply)
a  congestion tax  is still  part of the optimal  tax system-even  if the  direct time  saving  benefits  from
reducing congestion are ignored.
Setting (2.10) equal to zero, substituting from (2.13), and noting that OL/  a  = (JL/  ar)u(. /UN
- (HL  / at)(R / L)(u(. / UN ),  we obtain the optimal congestion tax:
T  = gIrUN I  C
This is just  the Pigouvian tax, equal to the marginal congestion cost. Thus, the marginal impact on labor
supply is positive up to point where the congestion externality is fully internalized,6
1 See for example  Bovenberg  and Goulder  (1998) for a survey  of the literature  on how pollution  taxes interact  with
the tax system. This is often referred  to as the "double dividend"  literature  as it explores  whether or not shifting
taxes off labor  and capital and onto environmental  "bads" can produce  two benefits  by improving  the environment
and reducing the costs of the tax system.
16  See Williams (1998) for more discussion  of optimal second-best  taxes on externalities  with feedback effects
(mainly in the context of health effects). Mayeres and Proost (1997) provide some discussion of congestion taxes as
part of an optimal tax system.
10(ii) Congestion Tax with Lump-Sum Replacement
Now  suppose  that  additional  government  revenues  are returned  to  households  in  lump-sum
transfers-the  standard textbook assumption. Using (2.9) the general equilibrium change in labor supply
in this case is:
_  - ~~+
(214)  dL  aL  B  LdG  aL ,dR
dr  ar  lOG  J  dz  Da  dvJ
The first and third terms  in this equation are analogous to those in the previous  case, equation  (2.11).
However the second term, which reflects the effect of increased transfers, is a negative impact on labor
supply (since leisure is a normal good, aL/aG<O)).  Thus (not surprisingly) the overall welfare impact in
the  labor market  is worse when revenues from  congestion fees finance transfers  rather than  labor tax
reductions-labor  supply always falls under this policy in our simulations.
(iii) Revenues used to subsidize public transit  fares17
It is well known that reducing congestion by a given amount using a combination of congestion
fees and metro subsidies is less efficient than relying on congestion fees alone, when there are three or
more transport modes (see e.g. Downs (1992)). Our numerical model captures this source of inefficiency
and  we  postpone  discussion  of  it to  Section 4.  For now  we  note  an important  additional  source  of
inefficiency from this policy, compared with the revenue-neutral congestion fee, which has not previously
received attention.
When congestion tax revenues finance a public transit subsidy, denoted s, we need to add sP to
the right-hand side of the government budget constraint (2.5) and to the right-hand side of the household
budget constraint (2.6). Thus s appears as an argument of the functions in (2.9) and, since t and G are now
constant, the general equilibrium change in labor supply is:
_  +  +
(215)  dL  tAL  +  DL  ds  aL ,dRl
d:  c9r  c  as dz-  aT  dvJ
Metro  subsidies increase  labor supply (aL/as > 0), since they reduce the  costs of commuting to work.
However, as proven in the Appendix, the potential increase in labor supply, and hence efficiency gain in
17 We do not consider  a policy  of directly  subsidizing  the metro, financed  by raising labor  taxes. Our focus is purely
on how the welfare  effects of congestion  taxes  crucially  depend  on the disposition  of the revenues  raised. Also,  since
our analysis is short run, we do not consider what happens  when subsidies  finance additional  metro capacity, as
opposed  to reducing  the private  cost  of using  existing  capacity.
11the labor market, is smaller when revenues are used to reduce the costs of using the metro, as opposed to
directly cutting the rate of labor tax.
3. Numerical Model of Work-Related Congestion
In order to explore, quantitatively, the welfare discrepancies between alternative congestion taxes
we nlow turn to  an extended version of the previous model, which we  solve numerically. This  section
describes the structure and calibration of this model.1 8
A. Model Structure
The  structure  of the  numerical  model  differs  from the  previous  analytical  model  in  several
respects. First, we incorporate a third mode of transport, a non-congested road. This enables us to model
more carefully the inefficiency associated with using revenues for public transit subsidies rather than for
cuts in distortionary taxes. Second we assume, more realistically, that tlhe production  of transportation
services requires real resource inputs (representing fuels, wear and tear on trains and cars, etc.) in addition
to hiousehold time. Finally,  in order to obtain empirical results we need to make  specific assumptions
about functional forms. Unless stated otherwise, variables are as defined in Section 2.
The hiousehold has the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form for utility:
U  (at;-C  -1  a1  F  T-  U -1  :r-
1 a-l7
(3.1)  U  =  (a,,C)  `  + (aN)  3  + j(aR  R)  7  + (ap P)  /  + (a,,F)  7
where  F  is the  number  of times  each household uses  a  non-congested road.1 9 The  ois  and  a's  are
parameters  (and similarly for all other  equations below). at, and  qo are the elasticities  of substitution
between leisure and consumption, and between transportation modes respectively, and the a's  are share
parameters.
We define the following transportation "production" functions:
(3.2a)  P = Min {¢i  ,O}
8 We are grateful  to Tom Rutherford  for help in developing  the programs  for our numerical  models.  The programs
are in  GAMS  with  MPSGE.
i9This  could represent  the same road as the congested  road, but at off-peak  hours, or an alternative  road that is not
congested  during  peak commuting  hours. It could also represent  walking  or cycling  to work. In practice of course,
there could be enough  traffic on the alternative  road such that additional  cars slow down average  travel speeds. To
keep  our results  transparent,  we ignore  the possibility  of multiple  congestion  externalities.
12(3.2b)  F -Min{  0  ,O'  }
CD
D  Xv?  RR  CD  D
(3.2c)  R  MMin  -,-  D = {(aD?N)  D  + (aDAS)  D
N  is the total amount of time spent per household travelling by transport modei  (i = P, F, R) in a given
period and X~ is total expenditures on purchased inputs (gasoline, car maintenance, train fares, etc.) for
each transport  mode. The  Leontief  functions  in  equations (3.2a)  and  (3.2b)  imply  that  one  trip  by
transport mode i requires a fixed amount of time equal to Oi  and a fixed amount of expenditure equal to A>.
In equation  (3.2c)  each road trip  requires a fixed amount  of expenditure  9,?  and  a fixed  amount  of a
composite D, consisting  of driving time NR  and  speed, S. Thus, the slower the  speed the  greater the
amount of time required to make a trip.0
Traffic speed is determined as follows:
(3.3)  S =  ,  -r 9 R
where ;Tj,  ir  > 0 are parameters. That is, speed declines linearly as traffic density (R) increases, which is a
typical approximation for the speed/density relationship over the relevant range (Morrison (1986)).
The production of market output X is determined as follows:
(3.4)  X  =Min  {ayiL,ar(R  + P + F)}
This expression  implies that transportation modes are perfect substitutes  in production, that  is, worker
productivity  is unaffected by  which transport mode is used to get to  work. In addition there  is fixed
proportions between labor supply L and the total number of trips R+P+F, in other words each day of work
requires a commuting trip. Goods market equilibrium requires:
(3.5)  X  = C + X  + X  + X
This equation says that the output of goods equals household consumption, plus goods that are required
for transportation.
The household time constraint is:
(3.6)  L =L+N+NR  +Np  +NF
That is, the time endowment is equal to the sum of labor supply, leisure, and total commuting time. The
household budget constraint is:
20  In practice  gasoline  consumption  increases  as congestion  raises travel times. However incorporating  this effect
into our model would have essentially the same impact as increasing the time delay costs associated with a given
level of traffic density.
13(3.7)  C+XR  +X'  +Xj  +rR-sP=(l-t)L+G
That is, the household spends on consumption, transportation goods, pays a tax of T to use the congested
road, and (if applicable)  receives a subsidy of s for  using the metro. Households choose consumption,
leisure, and how  much to travel  on each transport mode, to maximize  utility subject to  the transport
production functions, and the time and budget constraints.
Finally, the government budget constraint is given by:
(3.8)  G:=tL+rR-sP
where s > 0 only in the case where revenues finance a public transit subsidy. To start with, we assume
that the metro is provided privately rather than publicly.
B. Calibration
We  now  discuss  the  parameter  values  used  in  our  benchmark  simulations.  The  calibration
procedure itself is somewhat technical. Details are provided in a handout, available from the authors upon
request.
The consumption/leisure elasticity at,  is a key parameter that  determines the responsiveness of
labor  supply to  changes in household wages net of commuting costs.  We choose  (,, along  with the
leisure to  labor supply ratio, to imply values of 0.2 and 0.35 for the  uncompensated and compensated
labor supply  elasticity  respectively (all  =  1.52).21  Alternative  values are considered  in  the sensitivity
analysis. We assumne  a labor tax rate of 38 percent (other studies use similar values, e.g. Lucas (1990))2
Thus the value of commuting and leisure time at the margin is 62 percent of the gross wage, which  is
roughly consistent with the literature (Small (1992, pp. 43-4))23  These assumptions imply that (ignoring
21 These values are based on a recent survey  of opinion  among  labor  economists  (see Fuchs  et al. (1998),  Table 2).
They are economy-wide  estimates,  assuming  weights  of 0.6 and 0.4 for the male and female  labor supply elasticities
respectively.  The numbers  overstate  the sensitivity  of total days worked  to the extent  that workers change average
hours per day in response  to changes  in net wages,  as opposed  to changing  their participation  decision  or total days
worked in a year. However,  based on our understanding  of the literature,  the degree  of overstatement  is likely  to be
small.
22  We arrived at this figure as follows. The average rate of labor tax, which is relevant for the labor force
participation  decision,  is (approximately)  equal  to the sum of revenues  from  personal income,  payroll,  and sales and
excise  taxes, expressed  relative  to gross labor  eamings, and is about 35 percent.  The marginal  rate of tax (averaged
across individuals)  is about 43 percent (Browning  (1987)),  and this is relevant for decisions  about overtime  days.
Assuming the participation  decision and the overtime decision account for  about two thirds and one third
respectively  of the total labor  supply  response  to changes  in wages  gives a weighted  average  tax rate of 38 percent.
We abstract from non-tax sources of distortion in the  labor market since-at  least for the United
States-these are probably of minor importance  relative  to the tax wedge. For more discussion  of these issues see
e.g. Browning  (1994),  Abrego  and Whalley  (1998).
23  In fact there have been a large number  of studies  that attempt  to estimate  the value of time lost in commuting.  If
the value of time lost in commuting  was greater (less) than 62 percent of the gross wage, this would increase
14congestion  effects)  the  efficiency  loss  in  the  labor  market  from  financing  an  additional  dollar  of
government transfer payments by raising the labor tax is 24 cents, which is roughly consistent with other
models (see e.g. Snow and Warren (1996)).
To  start  with,  we  choose  the  transportation  mode  elasticity  o7j to  imply  the  size  of  the
uncompensated (general equilibrium) demand elasticity for trips with respect to monetary costs is initially
0.4 for  each mode (a,,=  0.8). This  is roughly consistent with the literature, 24 although obviously this
elasticity depends on, for example, the number and proximity of alternative transport modes to congested
roads in different urban areas. The parameters in the speed/density equation (3.3) are chosen to imply that
a  one  percent  reduction  in  road  users  would  raise  average car  speed  by  0.9  percent  in  the  initial
equilibrium.  ,)) is set at unity. For simplicity, we  assume (prior to  congestion policies)  that  the total
number of transport trips is divided equally among each transport mode (R =P = F). These assumptions
imply that the optimal reduction in traffic density in a first-best setting without distortionary taxes would
be  about  10  percent. 25 We  explore  in  some detail  what  happens  under  alternative  values  for  these
transportation parameters.
The remainder of our parameter assumptions have little effect on the relative welfare effects of
policies (though the absolute levels are sensitive to them). These assumptions are that the money costs are
the same on each mode (0, = 0 V i) and that the total amount of time spent commuting is one seventh of
total time at work in the initial equilibrium (M  = L/7). In addition, total money expenditures on transport
are set equal to  40 percent of the total  (gross of tax) time costs  of transport (EX  .4AM), which  is
roughly consistent with the literature (see e.g. Small (1992), pp.76-77).
4. Simulation Results
In this section we begin by presenting the results under our benchmark parameter values. Wethen
explore the sensitivity of the results to alternative parameter values. Finally, we discuss travel associated
withi  leisure as opposed to work activities.
(decrease) the magnitude of the efficiency gains from internalizing  the congestion  externality relative to the
efficiency  impacts  in the labor  market.
24 As a rough  rule of thumb a one percent  increase  in the cost  of using  a road  reduces  traffic density  by 0.33 percent,
at a specific point in time (Small, 1992, pp. 11). We use a somewhat  higher value to allow for intertemporal
substitution,  that is using  the congested  road  at off-peak  hours.
25  This is roughly consistent  with optimal traffic reductions  estimated in some other studies. See for example
Repetto  et al. (1992),  Table 12,  top panel.
15A. Benchmark Results
(i) Marginal  Welfare Efrfects
fIn  Figure  l a the horizontal axis shows percentage reductions  in traffic  density on the congested
road (i.e. reductions in the number of trips) below the level without congestion taxes. The vertical  axis
sihows  the marginal welfare effect of alternative congestion taxes (expressed as a percentage of the initial
moniey  costs of travel on1  the congested road).
,W'/(;  indicates the  marginal welfare  effect of a  congestion tax  in a  (hypothetical)  first-best
setting without distortionary labor taxes.  The height of this curve reflects thie  marginal externality  cost
of road use minus the tax rate, and corresponds to the "Pigouvian" welfare effect nz'Ruc/uN  r in equation
(2.10). The marginal welfare impact is positive up to the point when the tax reduces congestion by about
I 0 percent.
The other three curves in Figure 1 show the marginal welfare impacts of congestion taxes in the
(realistic) second-best setting with pre-existing taxes on labor. MW'4  denotes the case when congestion
tax revenues are used to cut the labor tax. This curve initially lies aboveMW "(;, when the net impact of
this  policy  is to  increase  labor supply and  produce an efficiency  gain  in the  labor  market. The  gap
between MWAX and ,W"''  is declining. This is due to declining marginal revenues from the increasing
the  congestion tax, and hence a smaller efficiency  gain from recycling  marginal revenues in labor tax
cUts, as  reduced  road  traffic  reduces the  base  of the  congestion  tax.  The optimal  amount  of traffic
reduction is about equal to that in the first-best case, which is consistent with our prediction in Section 2
that the optimal tax equals the Pigouvian tax.
MW-" is the marginal welfare  impact of a congestion tax with revenues recycled in lump-sum
transfers. This curve lies well belowi  l"'  since the net impact of the policy is to reduce labor supply,
prodLucilg  an  efficiency  loss in the  labor market.  Clearly, this  efficiency  loss dramatically  limits the
ability of this policy to enhance overall welfare. In fact in this benchmark case the intercept ofAW'S7 is
(slightly) below the horizontal axis, implying thatany level of congestion tax is welfare-reducing (this is
not a general result-the  intercept is positive in some of our later simulations).
Finlally.  ii'V"1'  is the  marginal welfare  gain  from the congestion  tax  with  revenues  used to
subsidize  public  transit  fares.  This  policy  is less efficient  than  the  revenue-neutral  congestion  tax  for two
reasons. First, to reduce congestion efficiently requires shifting commuters away from the congested road
and  onto the  non-congested road  as well as the metro. However, to the  extent that  the public  transit
subsidy  rather thani the congestion tax  reduces congestion, there  will not be the efficient  substitution
26 For this  case we set the  labor tax equal to zero and adjust the distribution parameters in the model to keep all
initial quantities (labor supply, road use, consumption, etc.) the same as in our benchmark model with pre-existing
taxes. Congestion tax revenues are returned lump sum to households.
16between the congested  and  non-congested roads. Second, though this  policy initially  stimulates  labor
supply, the increase is less than if revenues are used to reduce the labor tax. Up to the point whereM 4 T 1 7
and  IW"'('  intersect,  the  efficiency  gain  from  incremental  increases  in  labor  supply  exceeds  the
incremental efficiency loss from the sub-optimal allocation among transport modes.
(ii) Total Welfare Effects
In Figure lb we compare the total (as opposed to marginal) welfare  impacts of policies.  On the
vertical  axis we have the overall (general equilibrium) welfare gains under alternative congestion taxes,
expressed relative to the Pigouvian welfare gain (i.e. the welfare gain from a congestion tax in the first-
best version of model).
The top curve TW`4x shows the relative welfare  gain from the congestion  tax when  revenues
finanice cuts in the distortionary labor tax. This curve is roughly constant at about 2 implying that the
induced welfare  gains in the  labor market  are about  equal to the  Pigouvian welfare  gain.  In striking
contrast  TW-7', the  relative  welfare  impact  under the  congestion  tax  with  lump-sum  replacement,  is
always below the horizontal axis. In fact, reducing traffic by the optimal Pigouvian amount (10 percent)
would result in a net efficiency loss equal to almost double the Pigouvian welfare gain!
Thie gap  between  TW~x and  TWL-s reflects  the  efficiency  gain  from  using  congestion  tax
revenues to cut distortionary taxes (rather than returning them  lump sum). At the Pigouvian amount of
traffic reduction the gap between these curves is almost 4, implying that the efficiency gains from using
revenues  to  cut  distortionary  taxes  rather  than  finance  transfer  payments  is  almost  four  times  the
Pigouvian welfare gains. In other words, in these benchmark simulations there is drastically more at stake
in terms  of economic efficiency  in what the government does with congestion tax  revenues, than the
entire efficiency gains from internalizing the congestion extemality.7
27 We can do some  "back-of-the-envelope"  calculations  to check  this estimate.  If we approximate  by assuming  linear
demand  and marginal  social cost curves,  the Pigouvian  welfare  gain is the well-known  Harberger  triangle, equal  to
one half times  the reduction  in road  use times  the Pigouvian  congestion  tax, i.e. (Ro  - R&)d2.  The welfare  gain from
using congestion  tax revenues  to cut the labor tax equals the marginal excess burden of taxation (0.24) times
congestion  tax revenues  (zR 1). Expressing  the latter effect over the former  gives 0.48(1-r)/r  where r  = (RO-RI)/RO.
When  r=0. 1, this second-order  approximation  implies  that the efficiency  gain from recycling  revenues  in labor  tax
cuts  would  be 4.3 times  the Pigouvian  welfare  gain.
Our results appear to be consistent  with a recent study by Mayeres (1998). Using a computable  general
equilibrium  model  of the Belgian  economy,  she estimated  the costs of financing  additional  government  spending  by
raising congestion  taxes, labor taxes, and lump-sum  taxes. Using these results she infers that there would be a
substantial  efficiency gain from using congestion  tax revenues  to reduce distortionary  taxes rather than provide
lump-sum  transfers. However, due to rather different model structures and assumptions about labor supply
elasticities,  it is difficult  to directly  compare  our results  with Mayeres's.
17The curves T7W  (no tax) and 7WMI-T decompose the two sources of inefficiency when revenues
finance public transit subsidies (as opposed to cuts in labor taxes). TW""' 1(no tax) is the relative  welfare
gain from this congestion tax  in the hypothetical case with no pre-existing  labor taxes. The difference
between this  curve and unity reflects the welfare loss due to the  inability of this  policy to  induce the
efficient allocation of commuting across all transport modes. This source of inefficiency is initially small,
but amounts to about 50 percent of the Pigouvian welfare gain at a 10 percent reduction in traffic density.
Finally TWR"'l'  is the welfare gain from the congestion tax/metro subsidy when we  incorporate the pre-
existing labor tax. This curve lies above TWf""7(no  tax), since the net impact of the policy is to increase
labor supply therefore producing an efficiency gain when the labor market is distorted. ComparingTK"-'EJ
with TW7X, using congestion tax revenues for public transit subsidies rather than  labor tax cuts reduces
the welfare gain from congestion taxes by about 90 percent of the Pigouvian welfare gain. Of this about
50 percent is due to the less efficient allocation of commuting among transport modes, and the remaining
40 percent is due to the smaller efficiency gain in the labor market.
We make one further point. In practice local governments may  use congestion tax revenues for
other purposes than assumed in our model, in particular to finance the provision of public goods, or cuts
in property taxes and sales taxes. Some indication of how this would affect our results may be inferred
from Figure lb.  In our model the efficiency gain from recycling revenues in labor tax cuts rather than
lump-sum transfers  is 24 cents per dollar. Suppose, for example, that revenues were used to finance a
public good or other tax cut that generated net social benefit of 12 cents per dollar. For this case the total
welfare curve would lie halfway between 7W 74x and  TW'S7  in Figure  lb.  If net social benefits were 36
cents per dollar recycled the gap between TW"7  and TW's" would increase by 50 percent, implying that
the  congestion tax  would  generate a  general equilibrium  welfare  gain  equal  to  about  four times  the
Pigouvian welfare gain.
B. Sensitivity of Results to Key Parameter Values
We  now  consider alternative  values for  parameters,  focussing  only on  those  parameters that
significantly affect relative welfare impacts.
(i) Demand Elasticity  for  Road Use
We begin our sensitivity analysis by varying the transport mode substitution elasticityc7 between
0.2 and  1.4, as shown along the horizontal axis in Figure 2 (this varies the transport demand elasticity
between 0.1 and 0.7). This implies different optimal amounts of traffic reduction: in the first-best case the
optimal  traffic  reduction (i.e. wlhere  AMIF"' = 0 in Figure  la)  is 2.7 percent  when  o7 =  0.2 and  15.9
percent when a,,  1.4. Clearly, the easier it is for commuters to substitute between transport modes the
18less costly it is to reduce congestion. The vertical axis of Figure 2 shows the maximum welfare gain under
alternative second-best congestion taxes, expressed relative to the Pigouvian welfare gain. That is, we are
comparing the area under the marginal welfare curves above the horizontal axis in Figure la  to the area
under  A4e 1',  for different values of c7.
As thie  demand elasticity increases the Pigouvian welfare gain increases and this has the effect of
shifting up all the marginal welfare curves in Figure I a. Thus it becomes more likely that the  W-57' curve
will  have a  positive  intercept. The maximum  welfare potential  of the  congestion tax  with  lump-sum
replacement rises from 0 after o77  =  0.9 to about 30 percent of the Pigouvian welfare gain when o77  =  1.4
(see the MAXI7  curve). Thus, even when the demand for road use is very elastic the welfare potential of
this  policy is still well  below the amount that would be implied by a partial equilibrium analysis. The
relative welfare  potential of the other policies (indicated  by the  MXJAX,  ,ALMI  and  MAX  7' (tit) tax)
curves) are only modestly sensitive to the demand elasticity for road use.
(ii) Speed elasticity
In the first set of rows in Table  1, we re-calibrate parameters in equation (3.3) such that the (size
of) the  speed  elasticity  with respect to traffic  density varies between  0.6  and  1.2I8 This  implies the
optimal  Pigouvian traffic  reduction  is either  6.7 or  11.9 percent. When the speed  elasticity  is larger,
reducing  traffic  density  has  more impact  on  raising  speeds; hence the  Pigouvian  welfare  gains  from
congestion taxes are increased. The right-hand set of columns in Table  I shows the maximum  welfare
gains under policies expressed relative to the Pigouvian welfare gains. As the speed elasticity increases,
the size of the Pigouvian welfare gain increases relative to the welfare impact in the labor market, but this
only has a modest impact on the relative welfare potential of the different policies.9
(iii) Public transit Share and Pre-Existing Subsidies
Along the horizontal axis in Figure 3 we vary the initial share of commuting that is done by metro
between 5 and 50 percent (we scale the shares of traffic on the congested and non-congested roads up and
down  proportionately).  The  vertical  axis  again  shows the  maximum  welfare  gain  under  alternative
policies expressed relative  to the Pigouvian welfare gain. The relative welfare  impacts of the revenue-
28  When the speed elasticity  rises above unity the relationship  between speed and traffic volume (where volume
equals  speed  times density) becomes  backward  bending.  This situation  is often  referred  to as "hyper-congestion"  in
the literature.
29 We experimented  with a non-linear  speed/density  function,  However,  this had little effect  on our empirical  results
since  the linear function  provides  a reasonable  approximation  to a non-linear  function  when traffic is reduced  by a
relatively  modest  amount (around 10 percent or so). In addition,  our results are not very sensitive  to altemative
values  for a,).
19neutral congestioni tax, and the tax with lump-sum replacement, are not especially  sensitive the relative
size of the metro. In contrast, the maximum welfare gain under the congestion tax/metro subsidy falls
from 170 to 35 percent of the Pigouvian gain as the share of commuters using the metro falls from 50 to 5
percent  (see the ALIX'"'  curve). The smaller the size of the metro the more the  optimal reduction  in
congestioni  will involve substitution onto the non-congested road rather than more travel by public transit.
Since public transit subsides cannot induce the efficient degree of substitution between the congested and
noni-congested  road, this policy is relatively more inefficient the smaller the size of the metro. In addition,
public transit  subsidies are  less efficient  than  labor tax  cuts  at  stimulating  labor  supply the  less the
average household commutes to work by public transit.
Assuming the metro is publicly provided rather than privately provided has essentially no effect
on our results, if the metro continues to be priced at marginal cost (this change essentially just  raises the
pre-existing  labor tax  from 38 to  39  percent).  However in practice  public transportation  systems  are
typically priced at well  below marginal cost (see e.g. Dodgson and Topham (1987)). Bringing  in pre-
existing  public transit  subsidies  into our  analysis  further reduces  the  efficiency  loss from  recycling
congestion  tax  revenues  in (additional)  public transit  subsidies rather  than  labor tax  reductions.  For
example, when we  introduce a pre-existing public transit subsidy of 50 percent, the maximum  welfare
potential of the  congestion  tax with  revenues recycled  in (additional) metro  subsidies falls  from  140
percent to just 40 percent of the Pigouvian welfare gains.
(iv) Labor Market Parameters
In the second set of rows in Table  I we vary the consumption/leisure elasticity to be consistent
with plausible ranges for labor supply elasticities. 30 The more (less) responsive is labor supply to changes
in wages (net of taxes and commuting costs) the larger (smaller)  are the  welfare  impacts in the labor
market relative to the Pigouvian welfare effect of congestion taxes. Our results show a modest amount of
sensitivity to these elasticities. But even under conservative assumptions the welfare effect  in the labor
market is still important; for example, assuming low values for labor supply elasticities, it still reduces the
welfare  potential  of  the  congestion  tax  with  lump-sum  replacement  by  70  percent  relative  to  the
Pigouvian welfare gain. 31
3  The uncompensated  labor supply elasticity  varies between  0.05 and 0.30 and the compensated  elasticity  varies
between  0.20 and 0.50.
Note that a higher  (lower) labor  supply  elasticity  strengthens  (weakens)  both  the Pigouvian  welfare  effect and the
labor market effect. Thus, the ratio of these two effects is only moderately  affected by changing labor supply
elasticities.
20In the final set of rows in Table  I  we vary the labor tax rate between 33  and 43 percent (we
consider this  to  be  a  plausible  range).  This has  a  noticeable effect  on  our results-for  example the
maximum welfare gain when congestion tax revenues finance labor tax cuts varies between  168 and 222
percent of the Pigouvian welfare gain. Even when the labor tax rate is 33 percent however, the maximum
welfare potential of the congestion tax with lump-sum replacement is only trivially positive. Note that the
optimal traffic  reduction under the revenue-neutral congestion tax is not really affected by  labor supply
elasticities  and  labor tax  rates.  This  is  because  the  incremental  change  in  labor  supply,  and  hence
incremental welfare effect, becomes zero at the point when the congestion externality is fully internalized,
regardless of labor market parameters.
In short, these simulations demonstrate that two key results from our model are robust to a wide
range of values for transportation and labor market parameters. These results are: a tax shift off labor and
onto work-related traffic congestion causes an overall welfare gain of roughly double the Pigouvian gain
from internalizinig the externality; in contrast, a congestion tax with  lump-sum replacement may  easily
reduce  overall  welfare,  despite  the  gains  from  reducing  congestion.  An  intermediate  case  is  when
congestion tax revenues finance public transit subsidies, but the relative welfare impact of this policy is
highly sensitive to the importance of the metro relative to other transport modes.
C. Leisure-Related Travel
Most traffic  congestion is associated with people going to and from work. However there are
some notable examples of congestion at weekends caused by people going to the beach, shopping malls,
sports  events,  visiting  relatives  during  holiday  periods,  and  so  on.  In response  to  congestion  taxes
associated with these activities people may respond by re-scheduling these trips to other less busy times,
or by substituting into other leisure activities (e.g. spending more Saturdays gardening at home rather than
going to the beach). Possibly, people might also end up working more days,  but this effect  is probably
minimal. At any rate, the crucial point is that the congestion tax does not directly discourage labor supply,
and thereby avoids the efficiency loss in the labor market prior to revenue recycling.
Thus,  in  these  cases  a  congestion  tax  with  lump-sum  replacement  would  induce  a  general
equilibrium  welfare  gain  approximately  equal  to  the  Pigouvian  welfare  gain  from  internalizing  the
externality.  If  instead revenues were used to  reduce labor taxes the  general equilibrium  welfare  gain
would  equal  the  Pigouvian  welfare  gain,  plus  an  efficiency  gain  in the  labor  market  that  roughly
corresponds to the gap between TW"x and 7W'7'  in Figure  l(b).  That is, the optimal (revenue-neutral)
Pigouvian congestion tax could induce an overall efficiency gain of about 5 times the Pigouvian welfare
gain.
21More generally, some fraction of drivers on a congested road could be commuting to work while
the other drivers are involved in leisure pursuits. It is straightforward to infer the effects of a congestion
tax in our analysis by taking the appropriate weighted-average of results for the work-related and leisure-
related cases.  For example, suppose two thirds of the drivers in the rush  hour are commuting to work
while the  remaining third are  involved in leisure activities. Then the net welfare  loss from a tax with
luimp-sum  replacement that reduces traffic by 10 percent in Figure l(a) would fall from about 200 percent
of the Pigouvian welfare effect to about 100 percent.
5. Conclusion
This paper uses analytical and numerical models to examine how pre-existing tax distortions  in
the labor market affect the welfare impacts of road-pricing schemes, under alternative assumptions about
how the  revenues raised  are recycled.  For taxes  imposed on  work-related traffic  congestion, the  net
impact of a congestion tax with revenues returned lump sum to households is to reduce labor supply in
our analysis. In fact under plausible parameters the resulting efficiency loss in the labor market can more
than offset the efficiency gains from internalizing the congestion externality. In contrast, the net impact of
congestion taxes  is to  stimulate labor supply if revenues are used to  reduce labor taxes.  The resulting
efficienicy improvement in the labor market about doubles the overall welfare gains from the congestion
tax. Recycling the revenues in public transit subsidies rather than tax cuts is less efficient, and the relative
welfare discrepancy between these two policies is larger the greater the amount of traffic reduction. Taxes
on traffic congestion associated with leisure (as opposed to work) activities avoid the adverse impact on
labor supply, prior to revenue recycling. Indeed  when revenues are used to reduce  labor taxes  in our
simulations the overall efficiency gains can be several times the Pigouvian welfare gains.
The models presented above could be usefully extended in a number of different directions. First,
we assume a static analysis where the existing capacity of the transport system is taken as given. It would
be useful to explore how pre-existing tax distortions in labor and capital markets might affect the optimal
amount of investment in transportation infrastructure over the long run. In addition, our analysis does not
capture  the  potentially  important  long  run  efficiency  impacts of  congestion  taxes  brought  about by
induced changes  in the  location decision  of households and  finns  (see  e.g. Arnott  (1999) for  recent
discussion of these issues).
Second, we assume the congestion externality is the only source of pre-existing distortion within
the transportation sector. In practice there might be a variety of other sources of economic distortion that
importantly influence the overall welfare  impacts of a congestion tax. For example,  distortions due  to
pollution  externalities,  accident  and  road damage externalities,  congestion  externalities  on  alternative
22roads, or deviations from marginal cost pricing in public transportation systems. Furtherinore, there are
other  markets  outside the  transportation  sector that  contain pre-existing  distortions  besides the  labor
market. For example,  due to  provisions  in the  tax system, certain  markets,  such as those for  owner-
occupied housing and  medical  insurance, are heavily subsidized. This means that the efficiency  gains
from recycling revenues in labor tax reductions can include not only those in the labor market, but also
the efficiency  gains from reducing distortionary subsidies for tax-favored spending. Results from other
studies (Feldstein (1999), Parry and Bento (1998)) suggest that we may have significantly underestimated
the welfare gains from revenue-neutral congestion taxes.
Third, our focus is purely on the efficiency impacts of alternative congestion taxes. Clearly, the
manner  in  which  congestion  tax  revenues  might  be  recycled  would  have  important  distributional
consequences  that  affect  the political  feasibility  of alternative  policy  approaches. Nonetheless,  if for
political or other reasons, congestion tax revenues are used for purposes otlher  thani to cut distortionary
taxes, this can be at a huge sacrifice in terms of economic efficiency, and could even change the sign of
the overall efficiency impact from positive to negative. 32
Fourth, there  are a variety of other policies that might be used, and are being used, to reduce
congestion in place of road pricing, such as parking fees, high occupancy vehicle  lanes, direct subsidies
for public transport, and so o01.  It would be useful to explore how pre-existing tax distortions affect the
efficiency properties of these other policy options. Finally, it might be useful in future analyses to allow
for  a  more disaggregated treatment  of the labor market. Our quantitative  results  are likely to  change
somewhat if the labor supply elasticity of the group that benefits from the labor tax cut differs from the
group of (actual and potential) users of the transportation network.
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Appendix: Analytical Derivations
Deriving Equation (2.  1  0)
Using (2.1)-(2.4) and (2.6) we can define the household's indirect utility function as follows:
V(r, t,G,;i)=  Max  u(C,N)+T(R,P)+A{G+(1-t)L-C--R}±+y{L  -(1+r)R-(1±+)P-N}
where  A and y are the  marginal utility of income and time respectively. The indirect utility function is
expressed as a function of parameters that are exogenous to the household. Differentiating with respect to
these parameters, gives:
(Ala)  = -AR
26DV






(A I  d)  -=-R
To obtain the welfare impact of an increase in r, when revenues are used to reduce the labor tax,
we differentiate the indirect utility function, taking into account how the policy change affects congestion
costs through equation (2.4). This gives
dV  aV  DV dt  aV  ,dR
(A2)  =  +  -_
dT;  Di;  at  d  ,r  dTi
Substitutinig from (Al)  and (2.12), and dividing by A to convert to monetary units we obtain (2.10).
Proof that the increase in labor supply is smaller when revenues finance  the metro subsidy instead of the
labor tax reduction:
From totally differentiating  the government budget  constraint (2.5), with  respect to T; and s,  when we
include sP oni  the right hanid  side, we can obtain:
R  dR  dL  dP 
(A3)  dis  Pd  d
We need to compare the middle terms on the right-hand sides of equations (2.11) and (2.15). Substitute
(A3) and  aL/as=-(aL  /t)PIL  in (2.15). Substitute  (2.12) and  DL/8a;=(aL/Dt)R/L  in (2.11).
Comparing, we find that the change in labor supply is smaller by the term -y d  s  > 0  when revenues
finanice  the subsidy rather than the reduction in labor tax.
27Table 1. Sensitivity of Results with Respect to Key Parameters
Optimal reduction in traffic density (%/9)  Maximum Welfare gain (relative to
Parameter values  Pigouvian welfare gain)
Pigouvian  TAX  LST  METRO  TAX  LST  METRO
Benchmark  9.6  10.0  0.0  6.9  1.90  0.0  1.44
1. Speed elasticity
0.6  6.7  6.8  0.0  5.5  2.20  0.0  1.60
1.2  11.9  11.4  2.9  9.1  1.78  .10  1.35
2. Labor sup. elast.a
low  9.3  10.1  5.0  7.4  1.94  .30  1.48
high  9.4  9.3  0  7.8  1.82  0.0  1.38
3. Labor tax rates
33%  9.6  9.4  1.1  7.3  1.68  .01  1.28
43%  9.6  9.3  0  7.0  2.22  0.0  1.65
The uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities are 0.05 and 0.20 respectively in the low value case,
and .30 and 0.50 respectively in the high value case.
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